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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

I
\

CRANE CO., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs-

UTAH MOTOR PARK, INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent

Case No.
No. 8713

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Defendant the
value of a boiler installed in the Defendant's place of business. The action is founded on Chapter 2 of Title 14, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which provides in substance if an
owner of land enters into a contract of $500.00 or more for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
an improvement ·on the land and fails to obtain from the
contractor a bond for the protection of those who furnish
labor · and material in ·connection with said improvement,
that such owner becomes personally liable to those who so
furnished labor and material.
The invoice for the sale of the boiler, Exhibit 1, contains the following statement:
"The merchandise specified in this order is
purchased for resale, and therefore is not subject to
the State Sales Tax."
At the pre-trial hearing Judge Ellett stated as follows:
The record may show that I am going to grant
the defendant's motion to dismiss, and I do it upon
the ground and for the reason that Pretrial Exhibit
No. 1 shows that Crane Company had sold the same
to Walsh Plumbing and Heating Company for resale
and that they were not the owner of the boiler and
equipment at the time it was placed in the property
of the Utah Motor Park, Incorporated. (Record 7)
The action was dismissed by order of the court (Record 14) and appeal taken therefrom to this court (Record
15). An attempt was made by counsel for the Plaintiff in the
pre-trial hearing, but without much success, to obtain a stipulation of facts which would be helpful to this court. However, we believe it will not be disputed that the boiler in
question was recommended by the Plaintiff as being appro·
priate for the needs of the Defendant, and was purchased
from the Plaintiff by Walsh Plumbing Co. and installed by
Walsh in the Defendant's place of business, and that it was
delivered by Plaintiff directly to the Defendant's place of
business.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

,ARGUMENT
1. The Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.
Section 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides as
follows:
·
Failure to require bond-Direct liability.-Any
person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or
to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the
reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the
prices· agreed upon.
It is obvious that a statutory liability is created against
the owner under the circumstances stated. Thus, although
an owner has not dealt with those who furnish material, so
as to be liable to them on a contractual basis, the statute creates a liability in their favor against the owner. The ruling of
the trial court seems to imply that in order for a materialman
to come under the statute he must have dealt with the owner.
If this were true, there would be no reason for the statute,
a~ the owner would be liable to him on a contractual basis in
any event. The trial court said that the Plaintiff could not
recover because it was not "the owner of the boiler and
equipment at the time it was placed in the property of the
Utah Motor Park, Incorporated." If the statute is inter-
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preted to m~an that the materialman must be the owner of
the property. a~ the time of its installation, the contractual
relationship would' have to be between the materialman and
the owner. Under such circumstances a liability by contract
would be established between the parties, and there would
Le no reason for the statute to create a liability which already
exists. It is only when a contractual relationship is established between the materialman and the contractor that the
existence of the statute can be justified. That the property
was sold to Walsh for the purpose of resale does not prevent
recovery by plaintiff under the statute. As a matter of fact
it would seem that the statute contemplates a resale of the
property by the contractor to the owner in every instance.
This court has ,construed the statute on at least two
prior occasions. The first was in Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pacific 241. The Plaintiff Lumber Co. sued Darke who was the ·contractor, and Webb and
'vife, who were the owners, for material furnished by the
Plaintiff for the construction of a building on the land of the
W ebbs. The complaint alleges that the "Plaintiff extended
credit to Defendant Darke and delivered materials to
him. . . . " The court held the statute constitutional and
affirmed the judgment for the Plaintiff, and stated on page
246:
If the owner requires the contractor to procure
the statutory bond, he is protected against loss. If
he does not, he becomes liable to laborers and materialmen if the contractor fails to pay them, even though
he may have paid the contractor in full. He has his
remedy in his own hands.
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The second case is Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. v.
Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 Pacific ·341. He~e the Plaintiff
materialman brought suit against Victor H. S:now,the owner,
for materials furnished to A. H .. Snow, the contractor, which
were used in the 'construction of a dwelling on th~· owner's
property. The Supreme Court affirmed. the Judgment for the
...
Plaintiff and. stated on page 343: . . .
The purpose of the statute is to. prevent the owners of land from having their lands improved with the
materials and labor furni$hed and perf~rmed by third
persons, and thus to enhance the value of such lands,
without becoming personally respons.ible for the reasonable value of the materials and labor which enhances the value of those lands. The owner, may,
however, escape personal liability by obtaining the
bond required by the statute. In this-case the agreement between appellant and his father required the
latter to construct a dwelling upon the ·land of the
former. To do that materials and labor were necessarily required. It therefore became the duty of
appellant to require his father to execute the bond
provided for by the statute for the protection of those
who might furnish materials for and perform labor
on the dwelling which became part of the land .in
question and which enhanced its value. We are
forced to the conclusion, therefore, that appellant is
liable in this action for the value of the materials as
found by the jury. (Emphasis ours)
The statute provides that the owner who shall fail to
obtain the bond "shall be personally liable to all the persons
who have furnished materials .... " (Emphasis ours)
In each of the cases above cited the Pl~intiff was allowed to recover from the owner, although he had no con-
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tractual relationship with the owner. The contractual relashionship in each case was between the materialman and
the contractor. A sale of materials from the materialman
to the contractor occurred. The contractor became obligated
to pay for the same, and title passed to the contractor, and
he in turn in effect resold the material to the owner by installing the same in the building.
It is clear from the statute as well as the cases in which
this court has construed the same, that although a resale of
the merhandise was contemplated, such does not afford
defendant a defense to the claim of the Plaintiff herein sued
upon.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully
requests this court to set aside and reverse the order of
dismissal of the trial court and to make such appropriate
order as to permit this case to continue in the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD R. BOYER,
Of Romney, Boyer and Ronnow
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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